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Internal Motivations, External Coercion, and
Educating for Happiness
KENNETH SHOCKLEY t

I.

CHARACTER AND INSTITUTIONS

The overarching theme of the recent three-day visit of
His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet to the
campus of the University at Buffalo was "Promoting Peace
across Borders through Education." While the value of
education is obvious, I believe for His Holiness there is an
important theoretical reason why education, properly
construed, is the only way one can affect change. The values
His Holiness expresses, both as a Buddhist and as an
advocate of a universal ethic, commit him to bringing about
social change not through modifying behavior, but through
encouraging the reform of individual motivation.
We should start by looking at the way in which His
Holiness responded to questions about law and institutions
during the final session of his visit to Buffalo, the
conference on Law, Buddhism, and Social Change. He
tended to answer by appealing to individuals-their
character and their happiness-and not, in general, to
particular social structures that would bring about that
happiness. One exception to this tendency involved
education: during the conference he appealed to the law
faculty to reform their curriculum to infuse compassion in
their students; during his public address he appealed to
educators to instill compassion in their students. But there
was little otherwise in terms of ways we should modify our
behavior. Rather he tended to appeal to the value of
compassionate nature, the alleviation of suffering, and,
crucially, the reformation of our motivations. Motivation
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reform is essential to the alleviation of suffering and right
action.
Intuitively, the connection between education and the
reform of motivation is clear. With increased education, of
certain forms, one would expect individuals to be more
sensitive to the suffering of others. But there is an
important point of moral psychology that underlies this
seeming platitude that carries a philosophically significant
lesson, a point that might easily be overlooked because of
the intuitive clarity of his general theme: peace through
education.
The point of moral psychology is found in a potential
tension between diverse motivations: those found in
common construals of law, and those found in Buddhist
notions of personal development. More particularly, the
motivation elements of the pursuit of happiness seem at
tension with the motivation elements tied to law. Law
motivates right action through external constraint,
Buddhism through the universal drive for the alleviation of
suffering. Put another way, law operates by means of
external norms; Buddhism (and any religious traditions
focused on perfection of character) operates by means of
internal norms.
In His Holiness's response to questions about law and
institutional design we can see a way of dealing with this
incongruity: education. But, again, the appeal to education
is not a mere platitude; there is a profound conceptual
matter which underlies education as a way of dealing with
this tension. Education of a particular form provides the
best way to resolve this tension-and this mode of
resolution does not depend on the particular appeals His
Holiness made to education, but rather on the way someone
who advocates an ethic of personal perfection must treat
norms that operate through social reinforcement. The
tension between law and internal norms has an effect on
the nature and purpose of what I suggest would be
characteristically Buddhist law.
II. INTERNAL MOTIVATION AND LEGAL COERCION
To draw out this tension let me expand on some
rudimentary points about Buddhism (about which I claim
no expertise) and law. It is clear that Buddhist teaching
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focuses on individual development-and we can see that in
His Holiness's recurring focus on motivation in answer to
the widest range of questions. The concern should be with
our own character, the foundation for our motivation. Recall
the story of the monk concerned that he could lose his sense
of compassion for his jailers because of their abuse. The
concern was not with a wrong done, but with his own
capacity for compassion, the motivation with which the
monk thought, acted, and lived. The point, in summary, is
this: motivation emphasized in Buddhist teaching is an
internal motivation. Right motivation is something that
moves one to act appropriately from within one's own
character.
We can see the tie to happiness as a motivator.
Happiness moves us to act, as should the release of
suffering-and both move us to act from within; we do not
need external social, legal, or political pressures to move us
to act in accordance with our own happiness. Happiness
and cessation of happiness are thought by many to be
universal values (as John Stuart Mill pointed out in
Utilitarianism, with a slightly different conception of
happiness in mind1 ), even if they are not universally
instantiated in every act of every human. At least His
Holiness referred to these as universal human values, 2 and
not values particular to those with a Buddhist viewpoint.
The lesson we will conclude with then holds as long as these
values require internal motivation, and are not specific to a
Buddhist viewpoint. However I think the difficulty of
characterizing Buddhist law makes this requirement
particular salient.
If we characterize a Buddhist as someone who
maintains the elimination of suffering as their motivation,
it follows that one is only a Buddhist if one is motivated in
the right way. And so, it would seem, one cannot be forced
to have this motivation; of course one can be forced to
behave in a certain way, and, perhaps eventually become
habitualized to a certain way of behaving (and perhaps
even come to take on a motivation of some form-I will
address this below). But one cannot be forced to have a
motivation unless one accepts that motivation as one's
1. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861).
2. See HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA, ETHICS FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM (2001).
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own-even if this is under some level of duress (but recall
the story of the monk and his jailors). The point might be
put this way: you cannot be forced to be a Buddhist,
although you can be forced to behave like one; if motivation
matters, one cannot be compelled. Right motivation,
motivation for the alleviation of suffering, cannot be
impressed from without, unless one already adopts it as a
value. Sloganistically: Right motivation can't be forced, it
must be endorsed.
Now, shift to what we have referred to as the "King's
Law" (as opposed to monastic law). We might haggle over
whether the king's law is to be understood as essentially
coercive, or even that it's function involves the modification
of behavior (for it might be that law is the justification of
the use of force, for example), but it is the case that it is an
external source of behavior guidance. And this is the
feature of law relevant for my point.
Whether they take the form of prohibitions, injunctions,
or permissions, they are externally sourced. Laws
coordinate by sanctioning cooperative behavior-internal
motivation is a secondary concern. In short, legal norms are
external: they commonly operate by providing incentives to
refrain from performing certain actions. The point, as Mill
pointed out, is that the sanction of law is social, that is, its
motivational force is external.
III. BALANCING INTERNAL MOTIVATION AND EXTERNAL
NORMS

So what would be the focus of law (as a set of norms) if
it is to reflect the appropriately internal motivation so
central to Buddhism? It must be designed so as to promote
individual happiness-but that is too easy and too quick. It
must be designed so as to operate on one's dispositional
states, such that one is disposed to be motivated properly. It
must be designed to change hearts and minds, not merely
behavior.
So, if a law (let us refer to that law as a norm for now to
avoid complexities surrounding the contrast between law in
action and law as codified) is to be designed in such a way,
a way appropriate to the internalist norms of personal
development and motivation reformation, it must be
internally endorsed, not externally enforced. Importantly,
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this norm will not work to promote the values it is supposed
to instill unless one endorses it.
In the case of external norms, one need not care about
the norm or be motivated appropriately for the scope of that
norm to apply; while I might not care about social sanction,
the norms of social behavior will still be applied to me. But
how can we formulate norms that will encourage this, that
is, facilitate right motivation in the right way, rather than
enforce behavior that leads to happiness in a manner
entirely inconsistent with the internal focus of Buddhist
norms? More simply, how can we formulate norms that
capture the essentially internal motivation of Buddhist
norms? Notice how odd it would be to say "to make people
strive for their own happiness" rather than, more
appropriately, "to encouragehappiness."
This form of encouragement looks like the justification
for a social institution or policy, not a justification for
coercively restricting or condoning behavior. And if laws are
to manifest the internalist norms so central to an ethic of
personal perfection, they should not operate by focusing on
behavior. This contrast foreshadows the sort of law capable
of manifesting the right sort of norm.
What remains, I suppose, is to consider how one might
internalize these happiness-norms, how we might overcome
this internal/external norms divide. How might we
institutionalize norms encouraging happiness such that we
use external norms, in some fashion, to promote a certain
form of motivation.
This might seem a bit silly: clearly we internalize
external norms all the time-this method is as old as
parents "training" children to behave, as old as the carrotand-the-stick model of encouragement. Social programming
is one form; learning conventions is another. Once we come
to adopt certain values as "the way things ought to be
done," these norms motivate internally. Social pressures
are powerful mechanisms in this transference, but social
pressures operate in (at least) two very different ways.
One mode by which social pressures enact the adoption
of social norms is through simple behaviorism: behavioral
conditioning. But that looks very much like taking people as
mere means to a social end. While this might be acceptable
on occasion, His Holiness pointed out the importance of
respect during both his opening comments to this
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conference and during his public address. The individual
coerced is not treated in a manner befitting of an agent
worthy of respect, or in a manner consistent with an ethic of
personal perfection. This sort of unmitigated social
engineering operates on a very different mode than what
would seem appropriate for Buddhist (or any other) quest
for personal development, development from within.
Fortunately, there is an alternative mode. Education, as
exploration, investigation, and the elimination of ignorance
constitutes a means of internalizing happiness norms,
norms of personal perfection that seem less problematic.
And this will bring us back to the central theme of His
Holiness's visit.
IV. EDUCATION

If we educate (inculcate rather than indoctrinate)
people to seek happiness-and indeed here we should think
in terms of Aristotle's eudaimonia 3 rather than the
happiness of the hedonists-then they will likely come to
hold these happiness norms on their own. 4 Mistakes will
still be made, due to our ignorance, and so there will still be
a need for some form of law. But inculcating the drive for
happiness is one way of internalizing these laws, and
thereby making them bind.
Values might be inculcated not by enforcement and
coercion, but through encouraging discussion, exploration,
and open discourse. If individuals are encouraged to come of
their own accord to embrace norms of happiness then we
avoid the problems of external norms and coercion.
This may sound a little idealistic, but this seems the
way we instill norms into people when we are at our best,
and when they are at their best. Ideally, one does not
refrain from murder because one is concerned about the
punishment (at least generally), but because one sees the
law as reflecting the general moral norm (shared, from
within) that murder is simply wrong.
Now we can see the importance of education,
conceptually, in the idea of social change. Education,
3. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE
at 1729 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W. D. Ross trans., 1984).
4. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
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understood quite broadly, provides the only real avenue by
which we can encourage individuals to pursue an ethic of
personal perfection without running afoul of that very ethic.
Education, understood as the free and open investigation of
subjects of interest (that is, free of dogmatism and
ideological constraint) is nothing more than a means of
individuals coming to adopt (i.e., internalize) certain views.
When those views constitute norms of right conduct, in
internalizing those norms individuals adopt right
motivation. Education, then, properly construed, allows for
the inculcation of an ethic of personal perfection without
running afoul of the norms of that very ethic.
So how does this connect with the questions motivating
this discussion? In particular, how does a Buddhist point of
view add to current debates over the role of law in society?
And how should the government try to make society better
through law?
The answer is in seeing law, or at least the part of law
capable of instantiating the sort of norms appropriate for an
ethic of personal perfection, as a means of developing
institutional structures, not generating prohibitions,
injunctions, and permissions. By developing structures
which encourage individuals to investigate and deliberate
with one another about their shared values and concerns,
that is, by developing educational structures, law is capable
of encouraging individuals to pursue personal perfection.
And it is capable of doing so without running afoul of
concerns about external motivation or coercion. By
developing the right sort of institutional structures, we
educate for happiness.
More law of the encouraging sort may well lead to less
law of the prohibition/permission sort, if we are fortunate.
At least this is a reasonable hope. And here we see a lesson,
perhaps, that our own legal system might take from an
ethics of personal perfection. If we focus our efforts on the
development of institutions, educational and otherwise, we
would do well to foster opportunities for deliberative
exploration.
Even with this change of focus there will still need to be
law of the more coercive variety, of course. Not everyone
will pursue a life of right motivation, and even those who do
may need guidance in the coordination of their pursuits
with the pursuits of others. But I would expect a change of
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V. THE CATCH

However, there is a catch. While anyone, regardless of
their personal values and convictions, can see the value of
coordination, the value of personal perfection of the kind we
are considering may not be so universal. While the
justification for the coercive power of law can be made
(arguably, at least) for the sake of coordination and social
well-being, it is not so clear how a parallel argument might
take place for an ethic of personal perfection. Coordination
provides a value-neutral justification for the value of law. If
law is to promote a substantive set of values, like those
associated with an ethic of personal perfection, it does not
seem at all clear that individuals would endorse that law
unless they already endorsed the value that law would
encourage. One might take the institutional structures
designed to encourage others to pursue an ethic of personal
perfection to be in the best interest of those being subjected
to those laws. But in being subjected against the values
they have, such laws flirt with a dubious form of coercion.
In the particular case of Buddhist Law, the endorsement of
educational policies would not be easily justified unless the
populace already endorsed Buddhistic ideals.

